Saudi Arabia says it is developing a domestic civilian nuclear program and would prefer U.S. technology and cooperation. Its foreign minister said in May 2023 that the kingdom wanted to build the program with U.S. participation but intended to proceed. The central proliferation question is whether Saudi Arabia would enrich uranium domestically and what monitoring and legal limits would accompany any U.S. assistance.
What a Section 123 agreement requires
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act requires an agreement for significant U.S. nuclear cooperation with a foreign state. It sets nonproliferation criteria, requires U.S. consent for specified transfers and uses of U.S.-origin material and technology, and provides for congressional review, as detailed in the U.S. Code. But the statute does not require every partner to forgo enrichment or reprocessing. “Gold standard” refers to a policy model, not a universal legal requirement.
The 2009 U.S.-UAE agreement is a stronger voluntary model: the UAE renounced enrichment and reprocessing in its territory. A Saudi agreement could adopt the same renunciation, but Section 123 does not make it a default requirement. The Congressional Research Service review explains both the statute and the UAE precedent.
Saudi safeguards and IAEA monitoring
Saudi Arabia’s safeguards arrangements changed on December 31, 2024, when it rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol and moved to full implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA recorded the change in INFCIRC/746/Mod.1. Comprehensive safeguards require accounting for and verification of nuclear material declared under the agreement; the protocol’s termination strengthens the inspection framework as Saudi activity grows.
Safeguards are not the same as a ban on enrichment. They help verify that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful use and support detection of diversion. Any U.S.-Saudi arrangement would need to specify cooperation conditions, inspections, fuel supply, and how sensitive technology is controlled. The IAEA’s Saudi country safeguards record lists the kingdom’s agreements.
Why the issue matters to Israel
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in a 2023 interview that if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would seek one as well. That statement makes enrichment rights, verification, and U.S. consent safeguards central regional security issues.
For Israel, a normalization agreement could deepen regional ties while a poorly bounded nuclear arrangement could weaken nonproliferation norms. The relevant policy choice is whether the United States can support civilian energy while setting conditions strong enough to protect against diversion and regional escalation. Nuclear terms remain one part of the wider U.S.-Saudi package, described in the page on defense, arms, and Congress.